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Actual Causation and the Art of Modeling
Joseph Y. Halpern and Christopher Hitchcock
1 Introduction
In The Graduate, Benjamin Braddock (Dustin Hoffman) is told that the future can
be summed up in one word: “Plastics”. One of us (Halpern) recalls that in roughly
1990, Judea Pearl told him that the future was in causality. Pearl’s own research
was largely focused on causality in the years after that; his seminal contributions
are widely known. We were among the many influenced by his work. We discuss one
aspect of it, actual causation, in this article, although a number of our comments
apply to causal modeling more generally.
Pearl introduced a novel account of actual causation in Chapter 10 of Causality,
which was later revised in collaboration with one of us [Halpern and Pearl 2005].
In some ways, Pearl’s approach to actual causation can be seen as a contribution to
the philosophical project of trying to analyze actual causation in terms of counter-
factuals, a project associated most strongly with David Lewis [1973a]. But Pearl’s
account was novel in at least two important ways. The first was his use of struc-
tural equations as a tool for modeling causality. In the philosophical literature,
causal structures were often represented using so-called neuron diagrams, but these
are not (and were never intended to be) all-purpose representational tools. (See
[Hitchcock 2007b] for a detailed discussion of the limitations of neuron diagrams.)
We believe that the lack of a more adequate representational tool had been a se-
rious obstacle to progress. Second, while the philosophical literature on causality
has focused almost exclusively on actual causality, for Pearl, actual causation was
a rather specialized topic within the study of causation, peripheral to many issues
involving causal reasoning and inference. Thus, Pearl’s work placed the study of
actual causation within a much broader context.
The use of structural equations as a model for causal relationships was well
known long before Pearl came on the scene; it seems to go back to the work of
Sewall Wright in the 1920s (see [Goldberger 1972] for a discussion). However, the
details of the framework that have proved so influential are due to Pearl. Besides
the Halpern-Pearl approach mentioned above, there have been a number of other
closely-related approaches for using structural equations to model actual causation;
see, for example, [Glymour and Wimberly 2007; Hall 2007; Hitchcock 2001; Hitch-
cock 2007a; Woodward 2003]. The goal of this paper is to look more carefully at
the modeling of causality using structural equations. For definiteness, we use the
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Halpern-Pearl (HP) version [Halpern and Pearl 2005] here, but our comments apply
equally well to the other variants.
It is clear that the structural equations can have a major impact on the conclu-
sions we draw about causality—it is the equations that allow us to conclude that
lower air pressure is the cause of the lower barometer reading, and not the other
way around; increasing the barometer reading will not result in higher air pressure.
The structural equations express the effects of interventions : what happens to the
bottle if it is hit with a hammer; what happens to a patient if she is treated with
a high dose of the drug, and so on. These effects are, in principle, objective; the
structural equations can be viewed as describing objective features of the world.
However, as pointed out by Halpern and Pearl [2005] and reiterated by others [Hall
2007; Hitchcock 2001; Hitchcock 2007a], the choice of variables and their values can
also have a significant impact on causality. Moreover, these choices are, to some
extent, subjective. This, in turn, means that judgments of actual causation are
subjective.
Our view of actual causation being at least partly subjective stands in contrast to
the prevailing view in the philosophy literature, where the assumption is that the job
of the philosopher is to analyze the (objective) notion of causation, rather like that
of a chemist analyzing the structure of a molecule. This may stem, at least in part,
from failing to appreciate one of Pearl’s lessons: actual causality is only part of the
bigger picture of causality. There can be an element of subjectivity in ascriptions
of actual causality without causation itself being completely subjective. In any
case, the experimental evidence certainly suggests that people’s views of causality
are subjective, even when there is no disagreement about the relevant structural
equations. For example, a number of experiments show that broadly normative
considerations, including the subject’s own moral beliefs, affect causal judgment.
(See, for example, [Alicke 1992; Cushman 2009; Cushman, Knobe, and Sinnott-
Armstrong 2008; Hitchcock and Knobe 2009; Knobe and Fraser 2008].) Even in
relatively non-controversial cases, people may want to focus on different aspects
of a problem, and thus give different answers to questions about causality. For
example, suppose that we ask for the cause of a serious traffic accident. A traffic
engineer might say that the bad road design was the cause; an educator might
focus on poor driver’s education; a sociologist might point to the pub near the
highway where the driver got drunk; a psychologist might say that the cause is the
driver’s recent breakup with his girlfriend.1 Each of these answers is reasonable.
By appropriately choosing the variables, the structural equations framework can
accommodate them all.
Note that we said above “by appropriately choosing the variables”. An obvious
question is “What counts as an appropriate choice?”. More generally, what makes
a model an appropriate model? While we do want to allow for subjectivity, we need
1This is a variant of an example originally due to Hanson [1958].
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to be able to justify the modeling choices made. A lawyer in court trying to argue
that faulty brakes were the cause of the accident needs to be able to justify his
model; similarly, his opponent will need to understand what counts as a legitimate
attack on the model. In this paper we discuss what we believe are reasonable bases
for such justifications. Issues such as model stability and interactions between the
events corresponding to variables turn out to be important.
Another focus of the paper is the use of defaults in causal reasoning. As we hinted
above, the basic structural equations model does not seem to suffice to completely
capture all aspects of causal reasoning. To explain why, we need to briefly outline
how actual causality is defined in the structural equations framework. Like many
other definitions of causality (see, for example, [Hume 1739; Lewis 1973b]), the HP
definition is based on counterfactual dependence. Roughly speaking, A is a cause of
B if, had A not happened (this is the counterfactual condition, since A did in fact
happen) then B would not have happened. As is well known, this naive definition
does not capture all the subtleties involved with causality. Consider the following
example (due to Hall [2004]): Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks and throw them at
a bottle. Suzy’s rock gets there first, shattering the bottle. Since both throws are
perfectly accurate, Billy’s would have shattered the bottle had Suzy not thrown.
Thus, according to the naive counterfactual definition, Suzy’s throw is not a cause
of the bottle shattering. This certainly seems counterintuitive.
The HP definition deals with this problem by taking A to be a cause of B if B
counterfactually depends on A under some contingency. For example, Suzy’s throw
is the cause of the bottle shattering because the bottle shattering counterfactually
depends on Suzy’s throw, under the contingency that Billy doesn’t throw. (As we
will see below, there are further subtleties in the definition that guarantee that, if
things are modeled appropriately, Billy’s throw is not also a cause.)
While the definition of actual causation in terms of structural equations has been
successful at dealing with many of the problems of causality, examples of Hall [2007],
Hiddleston [2005], and Hitchcock [2007a] show that it gives inappropriate answers in
cases that have structural equations isomorphic to ones where it arguably gives the
appropriate answer. This means that, no matter how we define actual causality in
the structural-equations framework, the definition must involve more than just the
structural equations. Recently, Hall [2007], Halpern [2008], and Hitchcock [2007a]
have suggested that using defaults might be a way of dealing with the problem.
As the psychologists Kahneman and Miller [1986, p. 143] observe, “an event is
more likely to be undone by altering exceptional than routine aspects of the causal
chain that led to it”. This intuition is also present in the legal literature. Hart and
Honore´ [1985] observe that the statement “It was the presence of oxygen that caused
the fire” makes sense only if there were reasons to view the presence of oxygen as
abnormal.
As shown by Halpern [2008], we can model this intuition formally by combining a
well-known approach to modeling defaults and normality, due to Kraus, Lehmann,
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and Magidor [1990] with the structural-equation model. Moreover, doing this leads
to a straightforward solution to the problem above. The idea is that, when showing
that if A hadn’t happened then B would not have happened, we consider only
contingencies that are at least as normal as the actual world. For example, if
someone typically leaves work at 5:30 PM and arrives home at 6, but, due to
unusually bad traffic, arrives home at 6:10, the bad traffic is typically viewed as the
cause of his being late, not the fact that he left at 5:30 (rather than 5:20).
But once we add defaults to the model, the problem of justifying the model be-
comes even more acute. We not only have to justify the structural equations and the
choice of variables, but also the default theory. The problem is exacerbated by the
fact that default and “normality” have a number of interpretations. Among other
things, they can represent moral obligations, societal conventions, prototypicality
information, and statistical information. All of these interpretations are relevant to
understanding causality; this makes justifying default choices somewhat subtle.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we review the
notion of causal model and the HP definition of actual cause; most of this material is
taken from [Halpern and Pearl 2005]. In Section 4, we discuss some issues involved
in the choice of variables in a model. In Section 5, we review the approach of
[Halpern 2008] for adding considerations of normality to the HP framework, and
discuss some modeling issues that arise when we do so. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Causal Models
In this section, we briefly review the HP definition of causality. The description of
causal models given here is taken from [Halpern 2008], which in turn is based on
that of [Halpern and Pearl 2005].
The HP approach assumes that the world is described in terms of random vari-
ables and their values. For example, if we are trying to determine whether a forest
fire was caused by lightning or an arsonist, we can take the world to be described
by three random variables:
• F for forest fire, where F = 1 if there is a forest fire and F = 0 otherwise;
• L for lightning, where L = 1 if lightning occurred and L = 0 otherwise;
• ML for match (dropped by arsonist), where ML = 1 if the arsonist drops a lit
match, and ML = 0 otherwise.
Some random variables may have a causal influence on others. This influence
is modeled by a set of structural equations. For example, to model the fact that
if either a match is lit or lightning strikes, then a fire starts, we could use the
random variables ML, F , and L as above, with the equation F = max(L,ML).
(Alternately, if a fire requires both causes to be present, the equation for F becomes
F = min(L,ML).) The equality sign in this equation should be thought of more like
an assignment statement in programming languages; once we set the values of F
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and L, then the value of F is set to their maximum. However, despite the equality,
if a forest fire starts some other way, that does not force the value of either ML or
L to be 1.
It is conceptually useful to split the random variables into two sets: the exoge-
nous variables, whose values are determined by factors outside the model, and the
endogenous variables, whose values are ultimately determined by the exogenous
variables. For example, in the forest-fire example, the variables ML, L, and F are
endogenous. However, we want to take as given that there is enough oxygen for
the fire and that the wood is sufficiently dry to burn. In addition, we do not want
to concern ourselves with the factors that make the arsonist drop the match or the
factors that cause lightning. These factors are all determined by the exogenous
variables.
Formally, a causal model M is a pair (S,F), where S is a signature, which explic-
itly lists the endogenous and exogenous variables and characterizes their possible
values, and F defines a set of modifiable structural equations, relating the values
of the variables. A signature S is a tuple (U ,V ,R), where U is a set of exogenous
variables, V is a set of endogenous variables, and R associates with every variable
Y ∈ U ∪ V a nonempty set R(Y ) of possible values for Y (that is, the set of values
over which Y ranges). F associates with each endogenous variable X ∈ V a func-
tion denoted FX such that FX : (×U∈UR(U)) × (×Y ∈V−{X}R(Y )) → R(X). This
mathematical notation just makes precise the fact that FX determines the value
of X , given the values of all the other variables in U ∪ V . If there is one exoge-
nous variable U and three endogenous variables, X , Y , and Z, then FX defines the
values of X in terms of the values of Y , Z, and U . For example, we might have
FX(u, y, z) = u + y, which is usually written as X ← U + Y .
2 Thus, if Y = 3 and
U = 2, then X = 5, regardless of how Z is set.
In the running forest-fire example, suppose that we have an exogenous random
variable U that determines the values of L andML. Thus, U has four possible values
of the form (i, j), where both of i and j are either 0 or 1. The i value determines
the value of L and the j value determines the value of ML. Although FL gets as
arguments the vale of U ,ML, and F , in fact, it depends only on the (first component
of) the value of U ; that is, FL((i, j),m, f) = i. Similarly, FML((i, j), l, f) = j. The
value of F depends only on the value of L andML. How it depends on them depends
on whether either cause by itself is sufficient for the forest fire or whether both are
necessary. If either one suffices, then FF ((i, j), l,m) = max(l,m), or, perhaps more
comprehensibly, F = max(L,ML); if both are needed, then F = min(L,ML). For
future reference, call the former model the disjunctive model, and the latter the
conjunctive model.
The key role of the structural equations is to define what happens in the presence
of external interventions. For example, we can explain what happens if the arsonist
2The fact that X is assigned U + Y (i.e., the value of X is the sum of the values of U and Y )
does not imply that Y is assigned X −U ; that is, FY (U,X, Z) = X −U does not necessarily hold.
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does not drop the match. In the disjunctive model, there is a forest fire exactly
if there is lightning; in the conjunctive model, there is definitely no fire. Setting
the value of some variable X to x in a causal model M = (S,F) results in a new
causal model denoted MX←x. In the new causal model, the equation for X is very
simple: X is just set to x; the remaining equations are unchanged. More formally,
MX←x = (S,F
X←x), where FX←x is the result of replacing the equation for X in
F by X = x.
The structural equations describe objective information about the results of in-
terventions, that can, in principle, be checked. Once the modeler has selected a set
of variables to include in the model, the world determines which equations among
those variables correctly represent the effects of interventions.3 By contrast, the
choice of variables is subjective; in general, there need be no objectively “right” set
of exogenous and endogenous variables to use in modeling a problem. We return to
this issue in Section 4.
It may seem somewhat circular to use causal models, which clearly already encode
causal information, to define actual causation. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there
is no circularity. The equations of a causal model do not represent relations of
actual causation, the very concept that we are using them to define. Rather, the
equations characterize the results of all possible interventions (or at any rate, all
of the interventions that can be represented in the model) without regard to what
actually happened. Specifically, the equations do not depend upon the actual values
realized by the variables. For example, the equation F = max(L,ML), by itself,
does not say anything about whether the forest fire was actually caused by lightning
or by an arsonist, or, for that matter, whether a fire even occurred. By contrast,
relations of actual causation depend crucially on how things actually play out.
A sequence of endogenous X1, . . . , Xn of is a directed path from X1 to Xn if the
value of Xi+1 (as given by FXi+1 ) depends on the value of Xi, for 1 = 1, . . . , n− 1.
In this paper, following HP, we restrict our discussion to acyclic causal models,
where causal influence can be represented by an acyclic Bayesian network. That is,
there is no cycle X1, . . . , Xn, X1 of endogenous variables that forms a directed path
from X1 to itself. If M is an acyclic causal model, then given a context, that is,
a setting ~u for the exogenous variables in U , there is a unique solution for all the
equations.
3In general, there may be uncertainty about the causal model, as well as about the true setting
of the exogenous variables in a causal model. Thus, we may be uncertain about whether smoking
causes cancer (this represents uncertainty about the causal model) and uncertain about whether
a particular patient actually smoked (this is uncertainty about the value of the exogenous variable
that determines whether the patient smokes). This uncertainty can be described by putting a
probability on causal models and on the values of the exogenous variables. We can then talk
about the probability that A is a cause of B.
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3 The HP Definition of Actual Cause
3.1 A language for describing causes
Given a signature S = (U ,V ,R), a primitive event is a formula of the form X =
x, for X ∈ V and x ∈ R(X). A causal formula (over S) is one of the form
[Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]φ, where φ is a Boolean combination of primitive events,
Y1, . . . , Yk are distinct variables in V , and yi ∈ R(Yi). Such a formula is abbreviated
as [~Y ← ~y]φ. The special case where k = 0 is abbreviated as φ. Intuitively,
[Y1 ← y1, . . . , Yk ← yk]φ says that φ would hold if Yi were set to yi, for i = 1, . . . , k.
A causal formula ψ is true or false in a causal model, given a context. As usual,
we write (M,~u) |= ψ if the causal formula ψ is true in causal modelM given context
~u. The |= relation is defined inductively. (M,~u) |= X = x if the variable X has
value x in the unique (since we are dealing with acyclic models) solution to the
equations inM in context ~u (that is, the unique vector of values for the endogenous
variables that simultaneously satisfies all equations in M with the variables in U
set to ~u). The truth of conjunctions and negations is defined in the standard way.
Finally, (M,~u) |= [~Y ← ~y]φ if (M~Y←~y , ~u) |= φ. We write M |= φ if (M,~u) |= φ for
all contexts ~u.
For example, if M is the disjunctive causal model for the forest fire, and u is
the context where there is lightning and the arsonist drops the lit match, then
(M,u) |= [ML← 0](F = 1), since even if the arsonist is somehow prevented from
dropping the match, the forest burns (thanks to the lightning); similarly, (M,u) |=
[L ← 0](F = 1). However, (M,u) |= [L ← 0;ML ← 0](F = 0): if the arsonist does
not drop the lit match and the lightning does not strike, then the forest does not
burn.
3.2 A preliminary definition of causality
The HP definition of causality, like many others, is based on counterfactuals. The
idea is that if A and B both occur, then A is a cause of B if, if A hadn’t occurred,
then B would not have occurred. This idea goes back to at least Hume [1748,
Section VIII], who said:
We may define a cause to be an object followed by another, . . . , where,
if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.
This is essentially the but-for test, perhaps the most widely used test of actual
causation in tort adjudication. The but-for test states that an act is a cause of
injury if and only if, but for the act (i.e., had the the act not occurred), the injury
would not have occurred.
There are two well-known problems with this definition. The first can be seen
by considering the disjunctive causal model for the forest fire again. Suppose that
the arsonist drops a match and lightning strikes. Which is the cause? According
to a naive interpretation of the counterfactual definition, neither is. If the match
hadn’t dropped, then the lightning would still have struck, so there would have been
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a forest fire anyway. Similarly, if the lightning had not occurred, there still would
have been a forest fire. As we shall see, the HP definition declares both lightning
and the arsonist causes of the fire. (In general, there may be more than one actual
cause of an outcome.)
A more subtle problem is what philosophers have called preemption, which is
illustrated by the rock-throwing example from the introduction. As we observed,
according to a naive counterfactual definition of causality, Suzy’s throw would not
be a cause.
The HP definition deals with the first problem by defining causality as coun-
terfactual dependency under certain contingencies. In the forest-fire example, the
forest fire does counterfactually depend on the lightning under the contingency that
the arsonist does not drop the match; similarly, the forest fire depends counterfac-
tually on the dropping of the match under the contingency that the lightning does
not strike.
Unfortunately, we cannot use this simple solution to treat the case of preemp-
tion. We do not want to make Billy’s throw the cause of the bottle shattering by
considering the contingency that Suzy does not throw. So if our account is to yield
the correct verdict in this case, it will be necessary to limit the contingencies that
can be considered. The reason that we consider Suzy’s throw to be the cause and
Billy’s throw not to be the cause is that Suzy’s rock hit the bottle, while Billy’s did
not. Somehow the definition of actual cause must capture this obvious intuition.
With this background, we now give the preliminary version of the HP definition
of causality. Although the definition is labeled “preliminary”, it is quite close to
the final definition, which is given in Section 5. The definition is relative to a causal
model (and a context); A may be a cause of B in one causal model but not in
another. The definition consists of three clauses. The first and third are quite
simple; all the work is going on in the second clause.
The types of events that the HP definition allows as actual causes are ones of
the form X1 = x1 ∧ . . .∧Xk = xk—that is, conjunctions of primitive events; this is
often abbreviated as ~X = ~x. The events that can be caused are arbitrary Boolean
combinations of primitive events. The definition does not allow statements of the
form “A or A′ is a cause of B”, although this could be treated as being equivalent
to “either A is a cause of B or A′ is a cause of B”. On the other hand, statements
such as “A is a cause of B or B′” are allowed; this is not equivalent to “either A is
a cause of B or A is a cause of B′”.
DEFINITION 1. (Actual cause; preliminary version) [Halpern and Pearl 2005] ~X =
~x is an actual cause of φ in (M,~u) if the following three conditions hold:
AC1. (M,~u) |= ( ~X = ~x) and (M,~u) |= φ.
AC2. There is a partition of V (the set of endogenous variables) into two subsets
~Z and ~W with ~X ⊆ ~Z, and a setting ~x′ and ~w of the variables in ~X and ~W ,
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respectively, such that if (M,~u) |= Z = z∗ for all Z ∈ ~Z, then both of the
following conditions hold:
(a) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x′, ~W ← ~w]¬φ.
(b) (M,~u) |= [ ~X ← ~x, ~W ′ ← ~w, ~Z ′ ← ~z∗]φ for all subsets ~W ′ of ~W and all
subsets ~Z ′ of ~Z, where we abuse notation and write ~W ′ ← ~w to denote
the assignment where the variables in ~W ′ get the same values as they
would in the assignment ~W ← ~w.
AC3. ~X is minimal; no subset of ~X satisfies conditions AC1 and AC2.
AC1 just says that ~X = ~x cannot be considered a cause of φ unless both ~X = ~x
and φ actually happen. AC3 is a minimality condition, which ensures that only
those elements of the conjunction ~X = ~x that are essential for changing φ in AC2(a)
are considered part of a cause; inessential elements are pruned. Without AC3, if
dropping a lit match qualified as a cause of the forest fire, then dropping a match
and sneezing would also pass the tests of AC1 and AC2. AC3 serves here to strip
“sneezing” and other irrelevant, over-specific details from the cause. Clearly, all the
“action” in the definition occurs in AC2. We can think of the variables in ~Z as
making up the “causal path” from ~X to φ, consisting of one or more directed paths
from variables in ~X to variables in φ. Intuitively, changing the value(s) of some
variable(s) in ~X results in changing the value(s) of some variable(s) in ~Z, which
results in the value(s) of some other variable(s) in ~Z being changed, which finally
results in the truth value of φ changing. The remaining endogenous variables, the
ones in ~W , are off to the side, so to speak, but may still have an indirect effect
on what happens. AC2(a) is essentially the standard counterfactual definition of
causality, but with a twist. If we want to show that ~X = ~x is a cause of φ, we
must show (in part) that if ~X had a different value, then φ would have been false.
However, this effect of the value of ~X on the truth value of φ may not hold in
the actual context; the value of ~W may have to be different to allow this effect
to manifest itself. For example, consider the context where both the lightning
strikes and the arsonist drops a match in the disjunctive model of the forest fire.
Stopping the arsonist from dropping the match will not prevent the forest fire.
The counterfactual effect of the arsonist on the forest fire manifests itself only in a
situation where the lightning does not strike (i.e., where L is set to 0). AC2(a) is
what allows us to call both the lightning and the arsonist causes of the forest fire.
Essentially, it ensures that ~X alone suffices to bring about the change from φ to ¬φ;
setting ~W to ~w merely eliminates possibly spurious side effects that may mask the
effect of changing the value of ~X. Moreover, when ~X = ~x, although the values of
variables on the causal path (i.e., the variables ~Z) may be perturbed by the change
to ~W , this perturbation has no impact on the value of φ. If (M,~u) |= ~Z = ~z∗, then
z∗ is the value of the variable Z in the context ~u. We capture the fact that the
perturbation has no impact on the value of φ by saying that if some variables Z on
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the causal path were set to their original values in the context ~u, φ would still be
true, as long as ~X = ~x.
EXAMPLE 2. For the forest-fire example, let M be the disjunctive model for the
forest fire sketched earlier, with endogenous variables L, ML, and F . We want to
show that L = 1 is an actual cause of F = 1. Clearly (M, (1, 1)) |= F = 1 and
(M, (1, 1)) |= L = 1; in the context (1,1), the lightning strikes and the forest burns
down. Thus, AC1 is satisfied. AC3 is trivially satisfied, since ~X consists of only one
element, L, so must be minimal. For AC2, take ~Z = {L, F} and take ~W = {ML},
let x′ = 0, and let w = 0. Clearly, (M, (1, 1)) |= [L ← 0,ML ← 0](F 6= 1); if the
lightning does not strike and the match is not dropped, the forest does not burn
down, so AC2(a) is satisfied. To see the effect of the lightning, we must consider the
contingency where the match is not dropped; the definition allows us to do that by
setting ML to 0. (Note that here setting L and ML to 0 overrides the effects of U ;
this is critical.) Moreover, (M, (1, 1)) |= [L ← 1,ML ← 0](F = 1); if the lightning
strikes, then the forest burns down even if the lit match is not dropped, so AC2(b)
is satisfied. (Note that since ~Z = {L, F}, the only subsets of ~Z − ~X are the empty
set and the singleton set consisting of just F .)
It is also straightforward to show that the lightning and the dropped match are
also causes of the forest fire in the context where U = (1, 1) in the conjunctive
model. Again, AC1 and AC3 are trivially satisfied and, again, to show that AC2
holds in the case of lightning we can take ~Z = {L, F}, ~W = {ML}, and x′ = 0, but
now we let w = 1. In the conjunctive scenario, if there is no lightning, there is no
forest fire, while if there is lightning (and the match is dropped) there is a forest
fire, so AC2(a) and AC2(b) are satisfied; similarly for the dropped match.
EXAMPLE 3. Now consider the Suzy-Billy example.4 We get the desired result—
that Suzy’s throw is a cause, but Billy’s is not—but only if we model the story
appropriately. Consider first a coarse causal model, with three endogenous variables:
• ST for “Suzy throws”, with values 0 (Suzy does not throw) and 1 (she does);
• BT for “Billy throws”, with values 0 (he doesn’t) and 1 (he does);
• BS for “bottle shatters”, with values 0 (it doesn’t shatter) and 1 (it does).
(We omit the exogenous variable here; it determines whether Billy and Suzy throw.)
Take the formula for BS to be such that the bottle shatters if either Billy or Suzy
throw; that is BS = max(BT , ST ). (We assume that Suzy and Billy will not
miss if they throw.) BT and ST play symmetric roles in this model; there is
nothing to distinguish them. Not surprisingly, both Billy’s throw and Suzy’s throw
are classified as causes of the bottle shattering in this model. The argument is
essentially identical to that in the disjunctive model of the forest-fire example in
4The discussion of this example is taken almost verbatim from HP.
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the context U = (1, 1), where both the lightning and the dropped match are causes
of the fire.
The trouble with this model is that it cannot distinguish the case where both
rocks hit the bottle simultaneously (in which case it would be reasonable to say
that both ST = 1 and BT = 1 are causes of BS = 1) from the case where Suzy’s
rock hits first. To allow the model to express this distinction, we add two new
variables to the model:
• BH for “Billy’s rock hits the (intact) bottle”, with values 0 (it doesn’t) and
1 (it does); and
• SH for “Suzy’s rock hits the bottle”, again with values 0 and 1.
Now our equations will include:
• SH = ST ;
• BH = min(BT , 1− SH ); and
• BS = max(SH ,BH ).
Now it is the case that, in the context where both Billy and Suzy throw, ST = 1
is a cause of BS = 1, but BT = 1 is not. To see that ST = 1 is a cause, note
that, as usual, it is immediate that AC1 and AC3 hold. For AC2, choose ~Z =
{ST , SH ,BH ,BS}, ~W = {BT}, and w = 0. When BT is set to 0, BS tracks ST :
if Suzy throws, the bottle shatters and if she doesn’t throw, the bottle does not
shatter. To see that BT = 1 is not a cause of BS = 1, we must check that there
is no partition ~Z ∪ ~W of the endogenous variables that satisfies AC2. Attempting
the symmetric choice with ~Z = {BT ,BH , SH ,BS}, ~W = {ST}, and w = 0 violates
AC2(b). To see this, take ~Z ′ = {BH }. In the context where Suzy and Billy both
throw, BH = 0. If BH is set to 0, the bottle does not shatter if Billy throws
and Suzy does not. It is precisely because, in this context, Suzy’s throw hits the
bottle and Billy’s does not that we declare Suzy’s throw to be the cause of the
bottle shattering. AC2(b) captures that intuition by allowing us to consider the
contingency where BH = 0, despite the fact that Billy throws. We leave it to the
reader to check that no other partition of the endogenous variables satisfies AC2
either.
This example emphasizes an important moral. If we want to argue in a case of
preemption that X = x is the cause of φ rather than Y = y, then there must be
a random variable (BH in this case) that takes on different values depending on
whether X = x or Y = y is the actual cause. If the model does not contain such
a variable, then it will not be possible to determine which one is in fact the cause.
This is certainly consistent with intuition and the way we present evidence. If we
want to argue (say, in a court of law) that it was A’s shot that killed C rather than
B’s, then we present evidence such as the bullet entering C from the left side (rather
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than the right side, which is how it would have entered had B’s shot been the lethal
one). The side from which the shot entered is the relevant random variable in this
case. Note that the random variable may involve temporal evidence (if Y ’s shot
had been the lethal one, the death would have occurred a few seconds later), but it
certainly does not have to.
4 The Choice of Variables
A modeler has considerable leeway in choosing which variables to include in a model.
Nature does not provide a uniquely correct set of variables. Nonetheless, there are a
number of considerations that guide variable selection. While these will not usually
suffice to single out one choice of variables, they can provide a framework for the
rational evaluation of models, including resources for motivating and defending
certain choices of variables, and criticizing others.
The problem of choosing a set of variables for inclusion in a model has many
dimensions. One set of issues concerns the question of how many variables to
include in a model. If the modeler begins with a set of variables, how can she know
whether she should add additional variables to the model? Given that it is always
possible to add additional variables, is there a point at which the model contains
“enough” variables? Is it ever possible for a model to have “too many” variables?
Can the addition of further variables ever do positive harm to a model?
Another set of issues concerns the values of variables. Say that variable X ′ is a
refinement of X if, for each value x in the range of X , there is some subset S of
the range of X ′ such that X = x just in case X ′ is in S. When is it appropriate or
desirable to replace a variable with a refinement? Can it ever lead to problems if a
variable is too fine-grained? Similarly, are there considerations that would lead us
to prefer a model that replaced X with a new variable X ′′, whose range is a proper
subset or superset of the range of X?
Finally, are there constraints on the set of variables in a model over and above
those we might impose on individual variables? For instance, can the choice to
include a particular variableX within a model require us to include another variable
Y , or to exclude a particular variable Z?
While we cannot provide complete answers to all of these questions, we believe
a good deal can be said to reduce the arbitrariness of the choice of variables. The
most plausible way to motivate guidelines for the selection of variables is to show
how inappropriate choices give rise to systems of equations that are inaccurate, mis-
leading, or incomplete in their predictions of observations and interventions. In the
next three subsections, we present several examples to show how such considerations
can be brought to bear on the problem of variable choice.
4.1 The Number of Variables
We already saw in Example 3 that it is important to choose the variables correctly.
Adding more variables can clearly affect whether A is a cause of B. When is it
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appropriate or necessary to add further variables to a model?5 Suppose that we
have an infinite sequence of models M1,M2, . . . such that the variables in M i are
X0, . . . , Xi+1, Y , and M
i+1
Xi+1←1
=Mi (so that M
i+1 can be viewed as an extension
ofM i). Is it possible that whether X0 = 1 is a cause of Y = 1 can alternate as we go
through this sequence? This would indicate a certain “instability” in the causality.
In this circumstance, a lawyer should certainly be able to argue against using, say,
M7 as a model to show that X0 = 1 is cause of Y = 1. On the other hand, if the
sequence stabilizes, that is, if there is some k such that for all i ≥ k,M i delivers the
same verdict on some causal claim of interest, that would provide a strong reason
to accept Mk as sufficient.
Compare Example 2 with Example 3. In Example 2, we were able to adequately
model the scenario using only three endogenous variables: L, ML, and F . By
contrast, in Example 3, the model containing only three endogenous variables, BT ,
ST , and BS , was inadequate. What is the difference between the two scenarios?
One difference we have already mentioned is that there seems to be an important
feature of the second scenario that cannot be captured in the three-variable model:
Suzy’s rock hit the bottle before Billy’s did. There is also a significant “topological”
difference between the two scenarios. In the forest-fire example, there are two
directed paths into the variable F . We could interpolate additional variables along
these two paths. We could, for instance, interpolate a variable representing the
occurrence of a small brush fire. But doing so would not fundamentally change
the causal structure: there would still be just two directed paths into F . In the
case of preemption, however, adding the additional variables SH and BH created
an additional directed path that was not there before. The three-variable model
contained just two directed paths: one from ST to BS , and one from BT to BS .
However, once the variables SH and BH were added, there were three directed
paths: {ST , SH ,BS}, {BT ,BH ,BS}, and {ST , SH ,BH ,BS}. The intuition, then,
is that adding additional variables to a model will not affect the relations of actual
causation that hold in the model unless the addition of those variables changes the
“topology” of the model. A more complete mathematical characterization of
the conditions under which the verdicts of actual causality remain stable under the
addition of further variables strikes us as a worthwhile research project that has not
yet been undertaken.
4.2 The Ranges of Variables
Not surprisingly, the set of possible values of a variable must also be chosen ap-
propriately. Consider, for example, a case of “trumping”, introduced by Schaffer
[2000]. Suppose that a group of soldiers is very well trained, so that they will obey
any order given by a superior officer; in the case of conflicting orders, they obey the
5Although his model of causality is quite different from ours, Spohn [2003] also considers the
effect of adding or removing variables, and discusses how a model with fewer variables should be
related to one with more variables.
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highest-ranking officer. Both a sergeant and a major issue the order to march, and
the soldiers march. Let us put aside the morals that Schaffer attempts to draw from
this example (with which we disagree; see [Halpern and Pearl 2005] and [Hitchcock
2010]), and consider only the modeling problem. We will presumably want variables
S, M , and A, corresponding to the sergeant’s order, the major’s order, and the sol-
diers’ action. We might let S = 1 represent the sergeant’s giving the order to march
and S = 0 represent the sergeant’s giving no order; likewise for M and A. But this
would not be adequate. If the only possible order is the order to march, then there
is no way to capture the principle that in the case of conflicting orders, the soldiers
obey the major. One way to do this is to replace the variables M , S, and A by
variables M ′, S′ and A′ that take on three possible values. Like M , M ′ = 0 if the
major gives no order and M ′ = 1 if the major gives the order to march. But now
we allow M ′ = 2, which corresponds to the major giving some other order. S′ and
A′ are defined similarly. We can now write an equation to capture the fact that if
M ′ = 1 and S′ = 2, then the soldiers march, while if M ′ = 2 and S′ = 1, then the
soldiers do not march.
The appropriate set of values of a variable will depend on the other variables
in the picture, and the relationship between them. Suppose, for example, that a
hapless homeowner comes home from a trip to find that his front door is stuck. If
he pushes on it with a normal force then the door will not open. However, if he
leans his shoulder against it and gives a solid push, then the door will open. To
model this, it suffices to have a variable O with values either 0 or 1, depending on
whether the door opens, and a variable P , with values 0 or 1 depending on whether
or not the homeowner gives a solid push.
On the other hand, suppose that the homeowner also forgot to disarm the security
system, and that the system is very sensitive, so that it will be tripped by any push
on the door, regardless of whether the door opens. Let A = 1 if the alarm goes off,
A = 0 otherwise. Now if we try to model the situation with the same variable P , we
will not be able to express the dependence of the alarm on the homeowner’s push.
To deal with both O and A, we need to extend P to a 3-valued variable P ′, with
values 0 if the homeowner does not push the door, 1 if he pushes it with normal
force, and 2 if he gives it a solid push.
These considerations parallel issues that arise in philosophical discussions about
the metaphysics of “events”.6 Suppose that our homeowner pushed on the door with
enough force to open it. Is there just one event, the push, that can be described
at various levels of detail, such as a “push” or a “hard push”? This is the view of
Davidson [1967]. Or are there rather many different events corresponding to these
different descriptions, as argued by Kim [1973] and Lewis [1986b]? And if we take
the latter view, which of the many events that occur should be counted as causes of
the door’s opening? These strike us as pseudoproblems. We believe that questions
6This philosophical usage of the word “event” is different from the typical usage of the word in
computer science and probability, where an event is just a subset of the state space.
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about causality are best addressed by dealing with the methodological problem of
constructing a model that correctly describes the effects of interventions in a way
that is not misleading or ambiguous.
A slightly different way in which one variable may constrain the values that
another may take is by its implicit presuppositions. For example, a counterfactual
theory of causation seems to have the somewhat counterintuitive consequence that
one’s birth is a cause of one’s death. This sounds a little odd. If Jones dies suddenly
one night, shortly before his 80th birthday, the coroner’s inquest is unlikely to list
“birth” as among the causes of his death. Typically, when we investigate the causes
of death, we are interested in what makes the difference between a person’s dying
and his surviving. So our model might include a variable D such D = 1 holds if
Jones dies shortly before his 80th birthday, and D = 0 holds if he continues to
live. If our model also includes a variable B, taking the value 1 if Jones is born, 0
otherwise, then there simply is no value that D would take if B = 0. Both D = 0
and D = 1 implicitly presuppose that Jones was born (i.e., B = 1). Our conclusion
is that if we have chosen to include a variable such as D in our model, then we
cannot conclude that Jones’ birth is a cause of his death!
4.3 Dependence and Independence
Lewis [1986a] added a constraint to his counterfactual theory of causation. In order
for event c to be a cause of event e, the two events cannot be logically related.
Suppose for instance, that Martha says “hello” loudly. If she had not said “hello”,
then she certainly could not have said “hello” loudly. But her saying “hello” is not
a cause of her saying “hello” loudly. The counterfactual dependence results from a
logical, rather than a causal, relationship between the two events.
We must impose a similar constraint upon causal models. Values of different
variables should not correspond to events that are logically related. But now, rather
than being an ad hoc restriction, it has a clear rationale. For suppose that we had
a model with variable H1 and H2, where H1 represents “Martha says ‘hello’ ” (i.e.,
H1 = 1 if Martha says “hello” and H1 = 0 otherwise), and H2 represents “Martha
says ‘hello’ loudly”. The intervention H1 = 0∧H2 = 1 is meaningless; it is logically
impossible for Martha not to say “hello” and to say ‘’hello” loudly.
We doubt that any careful modeler would choose variables that have logically
related values. However, the converse of this principle, that the different values
of any particular variable should be logically related (in fact, mutually exclusive),
is less obvious and equally important. Consider Example 3. While, in the actual
context, Billy’s rock will hit the bottle just in case Suzy’s doesn’t, this is not a
necessary relationship. Suppose that, instead of using two variables SH and BH ,
we try to model the scenario with a variable H that takes the value 1 if Suzy’s rock
hits, and and 0 if Billy’s rock hits. The reader can verify that, in this model, there
is no contingency such that the bottle’s shattering depends upon Suzy’s throw. The
problem, as we said, is that H = 0 and H = 1 are not mutually exclusive; there are
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possible situations in which both rocks hit or neither rock hits the bottle. In partic-
ular, this representation does not allow us to consider independent interventions on
the rocks hitting the bottle. As the discussion in Example 3 shows, it is precisely
such an intervention that is needed to establish that Suzy’s throw (and not Billy’s)
is the actual cause of the bottle shattering.
While these rules are simple in principle, their application is not always trans-
parent.
EXAMPLE 4. Consider cases of “switching”, which have been much discussed in
the philosophical literature. A train is heading toward the station. An engineer
throws a switch, directing the train down the left track, rather than the right track.
The tracks re-converge before the station, and the train arrives as scheduled. Was
throwing the switch a cause of the train’s arrival? HP consider two causal models
of this scenario. In the first, there is a random variable S which is 1 if the switch
is thrown (so the train goes down the left track) and 0 otherwise. In the second,
in addition to S, there are variables LT and RT , indicating whether or not the
train goes down the left track and right track, respectively. Note that with the first
representation, there is no way to model the train not making it to the arrival point.
With the second representation, we have the problem that LT = 1 and RT = 1
are arguably not independent; the train cannot be on both tracks at once. If we
want to model the possibility of one track or another being blocked, we should use,
instead of LT and RT , variables LB and RB , which indicate whether the left track
or right track, respectively, are blocked. This allows us to represent all the relevant
possibilities without running into independence problems. Note that if we have
only S as a random variable, then S = 1 cannot be a cause of the train arriving;
it would have arrived no matter what. With RB in the picture, the preliminary
HP definition of actual cause rules that S = 1 can be an actual cause of the train’s
arrival; for example, under the contingency that RB = 1, the train does not arrive
if S = 0. (However, once we extend the definition to include defaults, as we will in
the next section, it becomes possible once again to block this conclusion.)
These rules will have particular consequences for how we should represent events
that might occur at different times. Consider the following simplification of an
example introduced by Bennett [1987], and also considered in HP.
EXAMPLE 5. Suppose that the Careless Camper (CC for short) has plans to go
camping on the first weekend in June. He will go camping unless there is a fire in
the forest in May. If he goes camping, he will leave a campfire unattended, and
there will be a forest fire. Let the variable C take the value 1 if CC goes camping,
and 0 otherwise. How should we represent the state of the forest?
There appear to be at least three alternatives. The simplest proposal would be
to use a variable F that takes the value 1 if there is a forest fire at some time, and 0
otherwise.7 But now how are we to represent the dependency relations between F
7This is, in effect, how effects have been represented using “neuron diagrams” in late preemption
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and C? Since CC will go camping only if there is no fire (in May), we would want to
have an equation such as C = 1−F . On the other hand, since there will be a fire (in
June) just in case CC goes camping, we will also need F = C. This representation is
clearly not rich enough, since it does not let us make the clearly relevant distinction
between whether the forest fire occurs in May or June. The problem is manifested
in the fact that the equations are cyclic, and have no consistent solution.8
A second alternative, adopted by Halpern and Pearl [2005, p. 860], would be to
use a variable F ′ that takes the value 0 if there is no fire, 1 if there is a fire in
May, and 2 if there is a fire in June. Now how should we write our equations?
Since CC will go camping unless there is a fire in May, the equation for C should
say that C = 0 iff F ′ = 1. And since there will be a fire in June if CC goes
camping, the equation for F ′ should say that F ′ = 2 if C = 1 and F ′ = 0 otherwise.
These equations are cyclic. Moreover, while they do have a consistent solution, they
are highly misleading in what they predict about the effects of interventions. For
example, the first equation tells us that intervening to create a forest fire in June
would cause CC to go camping in the beginning of June. But this seems to get the
causal order backwards!
The third way to model the scenario is to use two separate variables, F1 and F2,
to represent the state of the forest at separate times. F1 = 1 will represent a fire
in May, and F1 = 0 represents no fire in May; F2 = 1 represents a fire in June and
F2 = 0 represents no fire in June. Now we can write our equations as C = 1 − F1
and F2 = C × (1−F1). This representation is free from the defects that plague the
other two representations. We have no cycles, and hence there will be a consistent
solution for any value of the exogenous variables. Moreover, this model correctly
tells us that only an intervention on the state of the forest in May will affect CC’s
camping plans.
Once again, our discussion of the methodology of modeling parallels certain meta-
physical discussions in the philosophy literature. If heavy rains delay the onset of
a fire, is it the same fire that would have occurred without the rains, or a different
fire? It is hard to see how to gain traction on such an issue by direct metaphysical
speculation. By contrast, when we recast the issue as one about what kinds of
variables to include in causal models, it is possible to say exactly how the models
will mislead you if you make the wrong choice.
cases. See Hitchcock [2007b, pp. 85–88] for discussion.
8Careful readers will note the the preemption case of Example 3 is modeled in this way. In that
model, BH is a cause of BS , even though it is the earlier shattering of the bottle that prevents
Billy’s rock from hitting. Halpern and Pearl [2005] note this problem and offer a dynamic model
akin to the one recommended below. As it turns out, this does not affect the analysis of the
example offered above.
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5 Dealing with normality and typicality
While the definition of causality given in Definition 1 works well in many cases, it
does not always deliver answers that agree with (most people’s) intuition. Consider
the following example, taken from Hitchcock [2007a], based on an example due to
Hiddleston [2005].
EXAMPLE 6. Assassin is in possession of a lethal poison, but has a last-minute
change of heart and refrains from putting it in Victim’s coffee. Bodyguard puts
antidote in the coffee, which would have neutralized the poison had there been
any. Victim drinks the coffee and survives. Is Bodyguard’s putting in the antidote
a cause of Victim surviving? Most people would say no, but according to the
preliminary HP definition, it is. For in the contingency where Assassin puts in the
poison, Victim survives iff Bodyguard puts in the antidote.
Example 6 illustrates an even deeper problem with Definition 1. The struc-
tural equations for Example 6 are isomorphic to those in the forest-fire example,
provided that we interpret the variables appropriately. Specifically, take the en-
dogenous variables in Example 6 to be A (for “assassin does not put in poison”),
B (for “bodyguard puts in antidote”), and VS (for “victim survives”). Then A, B,
and VS satisfy exactly the same equations as L, ML, and F , respectively. In the
context where there is lightning and the arsonists drops a lit match, both the light-
ning and the match are causes of the forest fire, which seems reasonable. But here
it does not seem reasonable that Bodyguard’s putting in the antidote is a cause.
Nevertheless, any definition that just depends on the structural equations is bound
to give the same answers in these two examples. (An example illustrating the same
phenomenon is given by Hall [2007].) This suggests that there must be more to
causality than just the structural equations. And, indeed, the final HP definition
of causality allows certain contingencies to be labeled as “unreasonable” or “too
farfetched”; these contingencies are then not considered in AC2(a) or AC2(b). As
discussed by Halpern [2008], there are problems with the HP account; we present
here the approach used in [Halpern 2008] for dealing with these problems, which in-
volves assuming that an agent has, in addition to a theory of causality (as modeled
by the structural equations), a theory of “normality” or “typicality”. (The need
to consider normality was also stressed by Hitchcock [2007a] and Hall [2007], and
further explored by Hitchcock and Knobe [2009].) This theory would include state-
ments like “typically, people do not put poison in coffee” and “typically doctors do
not treat patients to whom they are not assigned”. There are many ways of giving
semantics to such typicality statements (e.g., [Adams 1975; Kraus, Lehmann, and
Magidor 1990; Spohn 2009]). For definiteness, we use ranking functions [Spohn
2009] here.
Take a world to be a complete description of the values of all the random variables.
we assume that each world has associated with it a rank, which is just a natural
number or ∞. Intuitively, the higher the rank, the less “normal” or “typical” the
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world. A world with a rank of 0 is reasonably normal, one with a rank of 1 is
somewhat normal, one with a rank of 2 is quite abnormal, and so on. Given a
ranking on worlds, the statement “if p then typically q” is true if in all the worlds
of least rank where p is true, q is also true. Thus, in one model where people do not
typically put either poison or antidote in coffee, the worlds where neither poison
nor antidote is put in the coffee have rank 0, worlds where either poison or antidote
is put in the coffee have rank 1, and worlds where both poison and antidote are put
in the coffee have rank 2.
Take an extended causal model to be a tuple M = (S,F , κ), where (S,F) is a
causal model, and κ is a ranking function that associates with each world a rank.
In an acyclic extended causal model, a context ~u determines a world, denoted s~u.
~X = ~x is a cause of φ in an extended model M and context ~u if ~X = ~x is a cause of
φ according to Definition 1, except that in AC2(a), there must be a world s such
that κ(s) ≤ κ(s~u) and ~X = ~x
′ ∧ ~W = ~w is true at s. This can be viewed as a
formalization of Kahneman and Miller’s [1986] observation that “an event is more
likely to be undone by altering exceptional than routine aspects of the causal chain
that led to it”.
This definition deals well with all the problematic examples in the literature.
Consider Example 6. Using the ranking described above, Bodyguard is not a cause
of Victim’s survival because the world that would need to be considered in AC2(a),
where Assassin poisons the coffee, is less normal than the actual world, where he
does not. We consider just one other example here (see [Halpern 2008] for further
discussion).
EXAMPLE 7. Consider the following story, taken from (an early version of) [Hall
2004]: Suppose that Billy is hospitalized with a mild illness on Monday; he is
treated and recovers. In the obvious causal model, the doctor’s treatment is a cause
of Billy’s recovery. Moreover, if the doctor does not treat Billy on Monday, then
the doctor’s omission to treat Billy is a cause of Billy’s being sick on Tuesday. But
now suppose that there are 100 doctors in the hospital. Although only doctor 1 is
assigned to Billy (and he forgot to give medication), in principle, any of the other
99 doctors could have given Billy his medication. Is the nontreatment by doctors
2–100 also a cause of Billy’s being sick on Tuesday?
Suppose that in fact the hospital has 100 doctors and there are variables
A1, . . . , A100 and T1, . . . ,T100 in the causal model, where Ai = 1 if doctor i is
assigned to treat Billy and Ai = 0 if he is not, and Ti = 1 if doctor i actually treats
Billy on Monday, and Ti = 0 if he does not. Doctor 1 is assigned to treat Billy;
the others are not. However, in fact, no doctor treats Billy. Further assume that,
typically, no doctor is assigned to a given patient; if doctor i is not assigned to
treat Billy, then typically doctor i does not treat Billy; and if doctor i is assigned
to Billy, then typically doctor i treats Billy. We can capture this in an extended
causal model where the world where no doctor is assigned to Billy and no doctor
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treats him has rank 0; the 100 worlds where exactly one doctor is assigned to Billy,
and that doctor treats him, have rank 1; the 100 worlds where exactly one doctor is
assigned to Billy and no one treats him have rank 2; and the 100× 99 worlds where
exactly one doctor is assigned to Billy but some other doctor treats him have rank
3. (The ranking given to other worlds is irrelevant.) In this extended model, in the
context where doctor i is assigned to Billy but no one treats him, i is the cause of
Billy’s sickness (the world where i treats Billy has lower rank than the world where
i is assigned to Billy but no one treats him), but no other doctor is a cause of Billy’s
sickness. Moreover, in the context where i is assigned to Billy and treats him, then
i is the cause of Billy’s recovery (for AC2(a), consider the world where no doctor is
assigned to Billy and none treat him).
Adding a normality theory to the model gives the HP account of actual causation
greater flexibility to deal with these kinds of cases. This raises the worry, however,
that this gives the modeler too much flexibility. After all, the modeler can now
render any claim that A is an actual cause of B false, simply by choosing a nor-
mality order that assigns the actual world s~u a lower rank than any world s needed
to satisfy AC2. Thus, the introduction of normality exacerbates the problem of
motivating and defending a particular choice of model. Fortunately, the literature
on the psychology of counterfactual reasoning and causal judgment goes some way
toward enumerating the sorts of factors that constitute normality. (See, for exam-
ple, [Alicke 1992; Cushman 2009; Cushman, Knobe, and Sinnott-Armstrong 2008;
Hitchcock and Knobe 2009; Kahneman and Miller 1986; Knobe and Fraser 2008;
Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Mandel, Hilton, and Catellani 1985; Roese 1997].)
These factors include the following:
• Statistical norms concern what happens most often, or with the greatest fre-
quency. Kahneman and Tversky [1982] gave subjects a story in which Mr.
Jones usually leaves work at 5:30, but occasionally leaves early to run errands.
Thus, a 5:30 departure is (statistically) “normal”, and an earlier departure
“abnormal”. This difference affected which alternate possibilities subjects
were willing to consider when reflecting on the causes of an accident in which
Mr. Jones was involved.
• Norms can involve moral judgments. Cushman, Knobe, and Sinnott-Armstrong
[2008] showed that people with different views about the morality of abortion
have different views about the abnormality of insufficient care for a fetus,
and this can lead them to make different judgments about the cause of a
miscarriage.
• Policies adopted by social institutions can also be norms. For instance, Knobe
and Fraser [2008] presented subjects with a hypothetical situation in which
a department had implemented a policy allowing administrative assistants
to take pens from the department office, but prohibiting faculty from doing
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so. Subjects were more likely to attribute causality to a professor’s taking a
pen than to an assistant’s taking one, even when the situation was otherwise
similar.
• There can also be norms of “proper functioning” governing the operations of
biological organs or mechanical parts: there are certain ways that hearts and
spark plugs are “supposed” to operate. Hitchcock and Knobe [2009] show
that these kinds of norms can also affect causal judgments.
The law suggests a variety of principles for determining the norms that are used
in the evaluation of actual causation. In criminal law, norms are determined by
direct legislation. For example, if there are legal standards for the strength of seat
belts in an automobile, a seat belt that did not meet this standard could be judged
a cause of a traffic fatality. By contrast, if a seat belt complied with the legal
standard, but nonetheless broke because of the extreme forces it was subjected to
during a particular accident, the fatality would be blamed on the circumstances of
the accident, rather than the seat belt. In such a case, the manufacturers of the
seat belt would not be guilty of criminal negligence. In contract law, compliance
with the terms of a contract has the force of a norm. In tort law, actions are often
judged against the standard of “the reasonable person”. For instance, if a bystander
was harmed when a pedestrian who was legally crossing the street suddenly jumped
out of the way of an oncoming car, the pedestrian would not be held liable for
damages to the bystander, since he acted as the hypothetical “reasonable person”
would have done in similar circumstances. (See, for example, [Hart and Honore´
1985, pp. 142ff.] for discussion.) There are also a number of circumstances in
which deliberate malicious acts of third parties are considered to be “abnormal”
interventions, and affect the assessment of causation. (See, for example, [Hart and
Honore´ 1985, pp. 68ff.].)
As with the choice of variables, we do not expect that these considerations will
always suffice to pick out a uniquely correct theory of normality for a causal model.
They do, however, provide resources for a rational critique of models.
6 Conclusion
As HP stress, causality is relative to a model. That makes it particularly important
to justify whatever model is chosen, and to enunciate principles for what makes a
reasonable causal model. We have taken some preliminary steps in investigating
this issue with regard to the choice of variables and the choice of defaults. However,
we hope that we have convinced the reader that far more needs to be done if causal
models are actually going to be used in applications.
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